SAOIRSE32

Irelandclick.com

Northern Ireland’s politicians face the challenge in the New Year of deciding if they are ready to take control of policing and justice in the province, Secretary of State Shaun Woodward said today.

In his New Year message Mr Woodward said the completion of devolution would be a another crucial step for people in the North and the government stood ready to devolve the remaining powers in May.

“The people of Northern Ireland want peace for their children and to be at ease with their neighbours. They want to concentrate on the things that really matter: their health and well-being, their prosperity, their future.

“And they expect the political parties to finish the job of devolution and devolve policing and justice powers to the Assembly,” he said.

Mr Woodward added: “It is for the parties to decide when the time is right, but the government will be ready to make the transfer of powers next May as envisaged in the St Andrews Agreement.”

Only when devolution was completed could Northern Ireland’s full potential realised, he added.

“When Northern Ireland’s politicians have the shared confidence to take over the full range of devolved powers the rest of the world will know that they have truly broken away from the past and are intent on building a new and better future,” said the Secretary of State.

He said he hoped the parties would embrace the challenge and work together to complete the process of devolution which had begun with such pace and promise.

Looking back on 2007 he said by any standards it had been a momentous year and there had been extraordinary progress since May 8th when devolution was restored and Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness launched the power-sharing government at Stormont.

“These events were viewed with optimism across the world, and the leadership shown by Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness has provided real hope that, however intractable they may seem, conflicts can be resolved and different traditions can work together for a better future.”

rte.ie
28 December 2007

Secret Government documents from 30 years ago reveal tensions between London and the newly elected Fianna Fáil Government.

The documents, which were released this morning, also show that the Government of the day faced some problems that would seem very familiar today.

After 30 years in Government vaults, the secret records of 1977 are on public view from 2 January at the National Archives in Dublin, the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland in Belfast, and the British National Archives outside London.

The big political story of 1977 was Jack Lynch’s historic election victory, winning the largest majority in the history of the State over the outgoing National Coalition led by Liam Cosgrave.

The election result was viewed with some misgivings in London where it was believed Fianna Fáil had adopted more Republican policies while in opposition.

The London papers reveal that Prime Minister Jim Callaghan refused a suggestion from Dublin that he and the new Taoiseach should discuss the British guarantee to Unionists when they met in September.

But they also show that the British were pleased that the new Government was maintaining existing security co-operation.

Irish Cabinet records show that Ministers agreed soon after the election to continue to allow British reconnaissance flights across the Border, a decision that later returned to haunt Mr Lynch.

The papers also show some familiar concerns including a suggestion by Aer Lingus that it might get involved in flights out of Belfast, but only on condition that they could fly direct to London.

And there was concern that a ministerial pay rise could lead to resentment among workers and cause difficulties in the negotiation of a new national pay agreement.

By James Downey
Irish Independent
December 29, 2007

So, there was a formal link between the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Irish Military Intelligence, known as G2.

This emerges in State papers, formerly secret, now opened for public viewing from January 2 under the 30-year rule.

It is not unusual for papers of a much earlier date, especially if exceptionally confidential, to appear publicly for the first time in these files.

External Affairs Minister Liam Cosgrave, afterwards Taoiseach from 1973 to 1977, made an agreement with the CIA director, Allen Dulles, after which he ordered the Irish embassy in London to facilitate the passage of information between the London CIA station and the G2 chief, a Colonel Callanan.

The messages were delivered by Ambassador Dr FH Boland’s secretary, a Miss Collins.

In a passage of a letter, he said Miss Collins, “like her predecessor, has always handled messages of a similar kind passing between Col Callanan and another governmental agency”.

Given the context, it might be assumed this referred to another US body, perhaps the FBI. But, it could equally well mean one of the British intelligence agencies.

It is well known that there was intense collaboration at more than one level between G2 and British Intelligence during the Second World War. It could be that the contacts, and some of the methods of passing on the information, had since been maintained seamlessly.

The ambassador’s close involvement must certainly raise eyebrows. It was presumably attributable to a desire to ensure that anybody in on the secret was completely trustworthy.

“Mr Cram”, a former US naval officer and a student in Trinity College Dublin, was appointed to deal with Ireland. His superior was a former American cavalry officer, Daniel De Bardeleben.

The Irish ambassador explained part of the modus operandi in the letter to the Department of External Affairs (now Foreign Affairs): “When Mr Bardeleben has something to send, it will be brought down here by special messenger and handed to Miss Collins. It will be in an envelope addressed to Colonel Callanan. Miss Collins will put this in a covering envelope marked ‘Secret’ and addressed to you, and dispatch it in the bag the same evening.”

But another Boland comment takes innocence to extremes: “Knowledge of matters of this kind should be confined as far as possible to a single individual.”

The arrangement has remained a secret for over half a century. It ties in neatly with the publication, in the same batch of State papers, of the disclosure that in the 1960s the Irish authorities searched Cuba-bound planes at the behest of Washington.

Intelligence agencies have to get their information somewhere. And Irish governments do not like to refuse American requests. But the same Irish governments call this country “neutral”.

- James Downey

Irish Independent
December 28, 2007

DOOMSDAY warnings were sounded about Ireland being plunged into civil war if Britain pulled out of Northern Ireland.

At the height of the Troubles in the mid-1970s official documents spoke of possible intervention by the United Nations, of the Irish Army needing 60,000 troops to control Northern Ireland in the event of widespread violence and of the enormous economic drain such an intervention would have on the country.

In one dire warning, the then Minister for Posts and Telegraphs Conor Cruise O’Brien predicted that if the British withdrew, “the pin is out of the bomb of civil war and neither our own army nor the UN nor anything else on earth will prevent that.”

One draft memo for government, dated 1974, predicted that, in the event of widespread violence that involved Irish intervention, up to 60,000 soldiers costing substantially more than £220 million a year would be needed.

And hinting at possible conscription, the memo reveals that even an intensive recruitment and publicity campaign would be most unlikely to achieve a rate of intake sufficient to raise army strength to 20,000 and that “steps other than voluntary recruitment” would be necessary.

It was against such a grim backdrop that Cruise O’Brien wrote to Foreign Affairs Minister Dr Garret FitzGerald in January 1975 and cautioned against the “serious danger” of “toying” with the idea of an international force to solve the Northern Ireland crisis.

Not only might such an intervention prove “entirely chimerical” but it might let Britain “off the hook” and provide her with an honourable path of retreat from Northern Ireland in circumstances offering only illusory guarantees for the minority.

According to Cruise O’Brien, it appeared the only likely outcomes — he would not call them solutions — were either a continuance of British rule or Protestant rule. And he advised that no further suggestions should be made in any international context of possible internationalisation of Northern Ireland.

Although unsigned, a handwritten draft reply, almost certainly written by FitzGerald, explained that Cruise O’Brien’s letter might be based on a misunderstanding of a memo from the Foreign Affairs Minister three months previously which was drawn up to discuss the situation in the North.

Dr FitzGerald said he was not convinced that discreet “toying with the idea” of internationalisation in any way constituted letting the British off the hook.

Ideally, they should be doing some “discreet groundwork” in Northern Ireland and internationally both to test in general the possible reaction to internationalisation.

Irish Times
28 December 2007
**Posted on indymedia.ie by Coilín

Then taoiseach Seán Lemass authorised searches of Cuban and Czech aircraft passing through Shannon after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 at the request of the United States. Details of searches were secretly passed on to the US authorities for the following eight years, writes Stephen Collins , Political Editor

Mr Lemass personally gave the go-ahead for the aircraft inspections and the data handover to embassy officials following a direct approach from US ambassador Mathew McCloskey, who called to see him in the taoiseach’s office.

Previously classified files opened to the public for the first time from this morning show that details about aircraft cargo and weight, and about passengers and their nationalities, were handed over along with details of overflights.

On December 6th, 1962, the government announced a ministerial order had been made invoking the power to search aircraft for “munitions and implements of war”.

The files show US assistance was first sought in October at the height of the crisis. A stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union had arisen out of the decision of Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev to arm Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba with nuclear missiles capable of striking targets in the US.

In October 1962 president John F Kennedy imposed a naval blockade designed to prevent any more missiles reaching the island. The confrontation led to the biggest crisis of the cold war and brought the world the closest it had come to a nuclear war.

When the US ambassador in Dublin sought an appointment with the taoiseach in October, a US embassy counsellor, Mr Sweeney, visited the Department of External Affairs and said Mr McCloskey would raise previous inquiries concerning the Shannon stopover involving Prague-Havana flights.

Mr Sweeney “spoke about these flights and the data the US administration were anxious to have”, according to Con Cremin, secretary of the department, in a November 2nd memo.

“He made it clear Washington has been worried about the extent to which the traffic through Shannon may have helped in the build-up in Cuba, and in particular in the transport of technical personnel and possibly of arms.

Mr Cremin said Mr Lemass rang him to record that he had told the ambassador the aircraft would be searched and if any “warlike” material was found, Ireland would consider refusing rights of transit.

“We will supply such manifest data as becomes available in respect of future flights and are prepared to make available similar data in respect of a reasonable past period, going back if necessary to the initiation of the service,” Mr Lemass told him.

Indymedia Ireland

Republican Commemoration - Dáithi Ó Conaill 1938 -1991

“His extraordinary political awareness in identifying the way forward was seen by his proposal that Bobby Sands contest the Westminster elections for Fermanagh/South Tyrone during the 1981 Hunger Strike…”

A Commemoration for Dáithi Ó Conaill will be held on Tuesday next, January 1, 2008 (New Year’s Day).Those wishing to attend should assemble at the gates of Glasnevin Cemetery in Dublin at 12.45pm. The main oration will be delivered by Josephine Hayden.

For information on Dáithi Ó Conaill, click here: http://www.rsf.ie/daithi.htm

Thanks,
Sharon

Related Link: http://1169andcounting.blogspot.com

By Brian Hutton
28 December 2007
Belfast Telegraph

Garda chiefs believed cross- border policing during the darkest days of the Troubles was hampered because detectives in the Republic had no private telephones, according to secret files.

Official documents, marked confidential and just released from the Irish Department of Justice, show half of the Garda Special Branch along the border could not be contacted at home in the late 1970s.

The force’s most senior ranking officers appealed to the Irish government to release money to bridge the apparent communications gap between them and their RUC counterparts.

In a report dated April 1976 and branded “secret”, an unnamed Garda Assistant Commissioner in the Security Department claims detectives were reluctant to contact the RUC from Garda stations.

The senior officer suggested the lack of private telephones was contributing to a breakdown in much needed contact with Northern detectives only miles away across the border.

“The Northern Ireland authorities have provided private telephones for members of the RUC Special Branch but these members cannot contact members of the Garda Siochana Special Branch except through Garda stations,” the report states.

“This method of contact inhibits cooperation as there is an element of secrecy involved, not only as to the content of communication but also as to the fact that contact exists between individual members.

“It will be appreciated members of the Garda Special Branch would be reluctant to openly contact their opposite members in Northern Ireland by using telephones in Garda stations.”

The Assistant Commissioner stops short of spelling out exactly why Special Branch detectives would not want rank-and-file colleagues to know about their private contact with the RUC.

He insists that it was agreed in a joint Garda/RUC report on Cross-Border Advance Planning and Operations that all Garda detectives working along the border would have telephones installed at home.

There were 36 detectives assigned to border areas at the time of the original 1976 report, although a review some months later showed there were 37.

Half of the original 36, named in the report and based in counties Donegal, Sligo, Monaghan, Meath and Louth, had no telephones in their homes.

The Assistant Commissioner also highlights elements of the joint Garda/RUC report that encourages “person-to-person contact” between members of Special Branch, North and South.

But an aide of then Justice Minister Patrick Cooney raises concerns about the request for funds and signals a reluctance to foot the bill.

The official points out, in response, that a secure 24-hour system of ” radio and telephonic communications” already operated between Garda and RUC stations in border areas for confidential exchanges.

“It is not clear why it should be necessary for individual members… to have telephones at their private residences… particularly as there is a security hazard involved in discussing anything of a security nature on ‘open’ telephone lines,” the official adds.

It appears from the files that Garda chiefs later accept the “usual telephone allowance” for the border detectives, which includes 50% of installation fees, 50% of annual rental and the cost of 360 local calls a year.

By Graham Bardgett
28 December 2007
Belfast Telegraph

Accusations that the RUC was not tough enough on loyalist terrorists were faced down in a letter from the then-Northern Ireland secretary of state to Britain’s ambassador to America.

In the confidential letter, released under the 30-year rule for government documents, Secretary of State Roy Mason told Ambassador Peter Jay how the Government was dealing with loyalist violence as well as that from the IRA.

He also touched on Britain’s ’special relationship’ with America.

In a briefing for Mr Jay for the Washington and New York political circuits, Mr Mason wrote how the Government and the security forces were as ” resolute in dealing with violence from Loyalist paramilitary organisations as with that from the IRA”.

He wrote: “The following notes will provide you with a background brief which you might draw on if the question arises”.

And he stated: “The policy of HM Government is that the law will be applied fairly and impartially to all sections of the community in Northern Ireland. The only criterion for the security forces therefore is whether the law has been broken.

“The security forces apply the law with equal determination to the terrorist criminals in both communities and their record speaks for itself.”

But Mr Mason pointed out: “I should say it is not our normal practice to release figures on the sectarian attribution of responsibility for violence.

“The accusation, however, remains a common one, and if pressed you may wish to back up your rebuttal with statistical material”.

During the first six months of 1977, violence from both sides was as follows: Loyalists had carried out 21 murders, 71 shootings, and 59 bombings.

Republicans had carried out 51 murders, 465 shootings, and 249 bombings.

Mr Mason told Ambassador Jay. “The majority of violent incidents continue to be the responsibility of the Provisional IRA and the balance of attention of the Security Forces is therefore directed towards the detection, arrest, and charging of members of that organisation”.

And the Secretary of State underlined that “significant inroads against those responsible for acts of violence in both communities” had been made.

He said: “The expertise in criminal detection which the Royal Ulster Constabulary have developed and the dwindling support for the terrorist organisations in their own communities have enabled the security forces to achieve increasing success in arresting and charging criminals from both camps.”

He went on to detail the numbers of loyalist and republicans charged with a range of terrorist offences.

Loyalists had been charged with 22 murders, 13 attempted murders, 62 firearms offences, 14 explosives offences and 150 other terrorist offences, totalling 261.

Republicans were charged with 35 murders, 61 attempted murders, 107 firearms offences, 62 explosives offences, and 158 other terrorist offences, totalling 423.

One of my favourite times for posting is at the New Year when government records which have been kept secret for 30 years are finally brought to light. There are all sorts of historical documents released at this time. It’s like finding treasure!

See also THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
of NORTHERN IRELAND and UK National Archives

28 December 2007
BBC

Historian Dr Eamon Phoenix examines newly-released government documents from 1977 which chronicle the beginning of the blanket protest and the segregation of paramilitary prisoners in jails in Northern Ireland.

The documents chronicle the beginning of the H-blocks protest

In the files, the official designation of paramilitary prisoners as “Protestant” and “Roman Catholic” is striking. A situation report dated 5 January 1977, noted that in Belfast Prison with 760 inmates, “the situation was tense”.

“In A Wing the self-imposed segregation by a number of Protestants continues,” the report said.

“In C Wing all untried prisoners are still locked in their cells and 124 RCs continue to refuse prison food but are eating their food parcels.”

By 12 January 1977, 42 prisoners in H2 Block at the Maze were refusing to wear prison clothes.

Among those protesting was Kieran Nugent of the Provisional IRA, the first person to “go on the blanket” following the ending of Special Category status in 1976.

Also protesting was Mairead Farrell, sentenced to 15 years in Armagh Jail for causing an explosion in 1976. She was later shot dead by the SAS in Gibraltar, in 1988.

Special Category

The number of protests against the ending of Special Category status continued to rise during the year.

By March 1977, the report noted starkly: “There are still 63 strippers” in the H-blocks.”

It was reported that on 9 March, after a prison officer was threatened by two UVF inmates at the Maze, the governor decided that the two men should be brought out for adjudication.

When talks with UVF spokesmen failed, 240 prison staff with a back-up of 125 military personnel, took up position at compound 21.

By this time the UVF prisoners had barricaded the entrance gates, “showing every sign of armed resistance,” according to the report.

The use of an APC (armoured personnel carrier) vehicle to break down the barricades was being considered when the two prisoners voluntarily gave themselves up.

On 15 March 1977, a report states that a proxy bomb, estimated at 50-60 lbs, exploded outside the prison.

Protesting

By June the number protesting had risen to 122.

According to a note in the file, the position of the “blanketmen” was raised at Westminster for the first time on 16 June 1977 by the Independent Nationalist MP, Frank Maguire.

He claimed that three prisoners had been “in a state of nakedness since early May… and are punished by three days solitary confinement every fortnight”.

Replying, Secretary of State Roy Mason stated that the prison rules required convicted prisoners to wear prison clothes.

“They have chosen not to wear it as a form of protest against the ending of Special Category status.”

The role of UVF commander Gusty Spence at the Maze is also highlighted in the releases.

According to the minutes of the Prison Management Committee of July 19, 1977, Spence had “banned alcohol in the UVF wing following drunken brawls on July 12″.

Two UVF prisoners were rejected because of “this spree” and were placed in cells.

28 December 2007
BBC

Historian Dr Eamon Phoenix looks back to 1977 in Northern Ireland as Stormont papers from 30 years ago are released.

James Callaghan initiated a debate on more MPs for Northern Ireland

The year 1977 saw the reduction of violence to its lowest level since the outbreak of the Troubles and a shift in British government policy away from power-sharing and towards a closer relationship between a weakened Labour government and the Ulster Unionists.

In a New Year statement, the IRA declared that they would “remove the British presence even if it meant reducing Belfast to rubble”.

A bomb blitz in London was followed in February by a concerted IRA campaign against leading businessmen in Northern Ireland.

On 2 February, the IRA shot dead Jeffrey Agate, the English-born head of the Du Pont Corporation in Londonderry and two more executives died in the following weeks.

A statement from the paramilitary organisation declared that “those executed had played a prominent role in stabilising the British-orientated economy”.

Loyalist paramilitaries were also active and a 10-year-old boy was killed when a bomb went off at an Official Republican gathering in west Belfast.

The spring of 1977 saw the deaths of two leading public figures.

In March, Brian Faulkner, last Stormont prime minister and head of the 1974 power-sharing executive, was killed in a riding accident and in April Cardinal William Conway, Primate of All Ireland, passed away.

Dominated

His successor was Monsignor Tomas O Fiaich, a native of Crossmaglen.

May was dominated by the United Ulster Action Council (UUAC) strike, launched by the DUP leader, Rev Ian Paisley, and his ally, Ernest Baird, and supported by the UDA.

The stoppage was called to demand a new security offensive against the IRA and the restoration of majority rule at Stormont.

On April 30, Dr Paisley announced that he would quit politics if the strike failed.

The strike began on 3 May but faced a determined attitude from the new secretary of state, ex-miner Roy Mason, who personally co-ordinated the government response from Stormont Castle.

Unlike in 1974, the British military was poised to seize the power stations and Mason’s blend of diplomacy and firmness kept the majority of power workers on board.

Intimidation was rife and a busman was shot dead but most people made their way to work.

As the RUC cleared roadblocks, Dr Paisley fell back on his Ballymena base, only to be charged with obstruction.

Mason was ebullient at the success of his tough line, later telling the BBC: ‘He was a coward, Paisley… went off to Ballymena and barricaded the town.

Gained ground

“I took off in my helicopter from Stormont Castle that day, singing, Don’t Cry For Me, Ballymena”.

In the subsequent council elections, the Ulster Unionists and SDLP gained ground with the DUP winning only 12.7% of the vote.

At the same time, British premier Jim Callaghan announced a Speaker’s conference to consider unionist demands for more Northern Ireland seats at Westminster, a policy resented by the SDLP as “implying integration”.

In May 1977, an undercover SAS soldier, Captain Robert Nairac, was kidnapped and murdered by the IRA in south Armagh.

In June, secret talks between loyalists and republicans under the Nobel peace laureate, Sean MacBride, failed and Fianna Fail, under Jack Lynch, swept the polls in the Republic of Ireland

In August, Queen Elizabeth paid a two-day visit to Northern Ireland as part of her silver jubilee celebrations.

A small bomb exploded at the Coleraine university campus shortly after she left.

In local politics, Paddy Devlin, the Belfast trade unionist was expelled from the SDLP for attacking it as “too green,” leaving Gerry Fitt as the party’s last authentic working-class leader.

The summer witnessed a feud between the Official and Provisional IRA which left four men dead.

In October, Mairead Corrigan and Betty Williams, founders of the Peace People, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

The death toll for the year was 110, including 67 civilians, 15 British military personnel and 28 RUC/UDR.

By Ed Carty
December 28, 2007
Belfast Telegraph

Jack Lynch’s Fianna Fail Government sanctioned British Army flights into Irish airspace, it emerged today.

A confidential Cabinet memo from July 1977 revealed that incursions and over-flights were formally agreed to by Mr Lynch’s ministerial team.

Even though it was the source of massive annoyance and aggravation for border communities, the Irish government decided to give the Army permission to enter the Republic.

The memo said the decision was simply continuing arrangements agreed by previous administrations.

Helicopters were allowed 2km (1.2 miles) over the border and “salient flights” were also permitted through Clonoony, the area of the Republic south-west of Clones which juts into the north.

Government papers marked “confidential” showed various types of over-flights were allowed.

By far the most controversial involved a 2km strip along the border which the British were given access to. Security flights were allowed into this stretch to take photographs of areas where terrorist incidents occurred most often.

The memo noted that the British wanted a comprehensive photographic record of the area and to identify any improvised bombs, devices or command wires not yet detected.

Units were also allowed over Irish territory to trace illegal crossing points used by terrorists and find firing points set up for IRA snipers.

Flights were supposed to last no more than 30 minutes, stay 2km away from Irish Army installations and no two flights were allowed over the same area in a 10-day period.

But it was later agreed to let the British Army fly back and forth over the border a number of times in the one flight. The British were also allowed ” normal” security checks, where units could go 500m (547 yards) into Irish airspace for photographic or infra-red reconnaissance of suspect devices or buildings.

The memo stated that the flights were permitted “in order to ensure that there are no command wires or other booby-trap devices awaiting the bomb disposal team which will tackle the suspect object”.

Requests for these were made on a case-by-case basis by the British Embassy and both Justice and Defence Departments were consulted before permission was granted.

By Tim Moynihan
December 28, 2007
Belfast Telegraph

The depth of the British Government’s concern after eight SAS soldiers were held when they strayed into the Republic in 1976 is revealed in papers released today by the National Archives.

London kept up a diplomatic onslaught on Dublin which included telephone contact between Prime Minister James Callaghan and his Irish opposite number Liam Cosgrave in the run-up to the men’s two day trial in March 1977.

They were acquitted on the more serious charge of possessing firearms with intent to endanger life and fined £100 each on the minor charge of possessing unlicensed firearms, to which they pleaded guilty.

Callaghan expressed his relief to Cosgrave on the outcome but Britain’s ambassador to Dublin, Robin Haydon, was moved to point out in a memo: ” The Irish have learnt a lesson and will go to some lengths to avoid a repetition.”

The men were held after straying across the border early on May 6, 1976.

A memo from the Northern Ireland Office said they were in three cars and were detained at a Garda checkpoint 300 to 400 metres inside the Republic.

Two were in the uniform of the Parachute Regiment, the remaining six in civilian clothes, and they were armed with a total of 11 weapons.

The British made immediate efforts to have them freed, but a note to the Prime Minister said: “The Irish Government claim (as no doubt we would in similar circumstances) that they can do nothing to intervene with the Director of Public Prosecutions.”

They appeared in court on the evening of May 6 and were granted bail in the sum of £5,000 each, the British authorities depositing a cheque for £40,000 with the court.

In the months that followed there was heart-searching about whether the men should return for trial and intense efforts by the British failed to head off court proceedings.

Northern Ireland Secretary Merlyn Rees told Callaghan: “The facts of the incursion are clear. There was never any intention to cross the border… Given the terrain, experience has shown how difficult it is to guarantee that accidental incursions of this kind are avoided entirely.”

The nub of the matter “may be less a question of the Irish Attorney’s powers than the Irish Government’s political will to intervene. Because of political and public opinion constraints they will be most reluctant to be seen to be giving in to political pressure from us.”

Rees met Irish ministers in Dublin on May 28, and briefed Callaghan: ” To sum up: the Irish are now unmistakably aware of our concern and of the danger to our mutual security interests which would follow from a hitch in the case.”

However, as the trial date of March 7, 1977 approached, concern intensified with no sign of the charges being dropped.

Six days before the trial, Callaghan sent a message to the Taoiseach warning that if matters were to go wrong, “the consequences for evil between our two countries will be incalculable”.

Cosgrave wrote back saying: “I do not think that the question of detention will arise but if it does you can be assured that it will be in a military barracks.”

And he added: “… our best advice is that it is extremely unlikely that there will be a prison sentence.”

28 December 2007
BBC

Secret Public Record Office files from 1977 show senior Stormont officials believed Ian Paisley was associated with loyalist paramilitaries.

Officials considered arresting Ian Paisley

The remarks made by the officials reveal they considered arresting the now first minister for conspiracy.

Almost 400 confidential state papers from 30 years ago were released but 50 files remain closed.

Among them are documents relating to the economic activities of paramilitary organisations.

The remarks on Mr Paisley were recorded in the minutes of a conversation among senior Stormont officials during the United Ulster Action Council Strike.

It was suggested that the DUP leader should be arrested for conspiracy.

The documents also show that the military was ready to seize power stations if workers threatened a stoppage.

State papers released in the Irish Republic reveal that Lord Mountbatten, murdered by the IRA in 1979, was in favour of Irish unity.

29 December 2007
BBC

Former Northern Ireland Police Ombudsman Nuala O’Loan has been made a Dame by the Queen in the New Year Honours.

Nuala O’Loan has been made a Dame

Mrs O’Loan stepped down as ombudsman in November after seven years.

She pioneered the role, aimed at providing an independent complaints service for the public about the conduct of the police.

Paying tribute to her staff, she said the honour was “like an affirmation of seven years very, very hard work”.

“I think in a way too, it’s a tribute to all those who helped me,” she said.

“Particularly I want to thank my husband, Declan, our boys, and all my staff.

Impartial Reporter
29 December 2007

The Police Ombudsman has come in for scathing criticism over the prosecution of a “very brave officer” who attempted to arrest a Fermanagh Gaelic football supporter for allegedly shouting “Up the ‘RA” at a Royal Black Preceptory church parade in Enniskillen.

Constable Keith McCabe was charged with assaulting Brian O’Connor after he allegedly used excessive force in arresting the Republican Sinn Fein Election worker.

O’Connor and another man, Paul Corrigan, were initially charged with disorderly behaviour but the Public Prosecution Service “inexplicably” dropped the cases against them and instead began proceedings against the police officer.

Constable McCabe’s defence barrister, Mr. David Dunlop, BL, said a “shocking and outrageous” investigation by the Ombudsman’s office had led to a “travesty of justice” in the decision to prosecute the officer.

Dismissing the charge, Mr. James McFarland, R.M., said he had sympathy with Mr. Dunlop’s remarks and they were not without basis.

“Had it been investigated fairly and properly this case would never have got off the ground,” he stated.

“This was an investigation quite clearly loaded against Constable McCabe from the word go,” he added.

“It has all the hallmarks of a witch hunt. It’s just about as unsatisfactory an investigation by the Ombudsman’s Office that it has been my misfortune to come across,” said the R.M.

He said that if it had been his decision, Mr. O’Connor should have been before the court.

“It’s a matter of regret that the charges were dropped,” he stated.

He said it was also a matter of regret that a constable “who behaved as bravely as he did” should have to wait until now to have his name cleared and be able to resume his normal life.

“That must have been a very traumatic time,” said the R.M., and had to be contrasted with the “almost cavalier attitude” of the Police Ombudsman’s Office.

“An innocent man has been affected in the most traumatic way,” added the R.M.

Fermanagh Court heard that the incident that gave rise to the officer being charged with assault took place around 8pm on Sunday, July 30, last year.

Fermanagh had been beaten by Donegal in the all-Ireland qualifiers and there were numerous supporters “milling about” in their green and white tops.

At the same time the Royal Black Preceptory who had been attending a service in Enniskillen Methodist Church began parading through the town, accompanied by a pipe band, travelling against the normal direction of traffic flow.

The prosecuting counsel said that as the parade made its way down East Bridge Street towards the cenotaph some of the GAA fans took umbrage and began shouting abuse and giving Nazi salutes.

He said Brian O’Connor and his brother Philip were walking up East Bridge Street accompanied by Colm Donnelly and his girlfriend, Edel McCusker, when they met the parade.

Mr. O’Connor gave evidence that they were just talking among themselves and none of them shouted abuse at the parade.

He said Constable McCabe, who was walking alone at the back of the parade, came over and grabbed him, accusing him of shouting abuse and “Up the ‘RA,” and arresting him for being disorderly. He was placed in handcuffs and then kicked on the back of the leg and “manhandled” into the back of a police car.

“In no way was I resisting him or interfering with him,” stated Mr. O’Connor.

The court heard that when the police officer was interviewed about the incident he made the case that he had put his knee into the back of Mr. O’Connor’s knee because he was refusing to get into the police car. He maintained this was a reasonable and proper use of force to get Mr. O’Connor to bend his leg so that he could get him into the car.

Dunlop McCubbin, a deputy senior investigating officer with the Police Ombudsman’s office, subsequently accepted under cross-examination that such “knee strikes” are a recognised tactic used by the police.

A doctor who examined O’Connor could find no evidence of any swelling or bruising but Mr. O’Connor complained of “tenderness” to the back of his left leg and took the following week off work.

Cross-examined by Mr. Dunlop about his involvement as an election worker with Republican Sinn Fein, Mr. O’Connor, said he did not support “eternal hostility” to the PSNI.

“This is a very live political issue in the nationalist community. In the last fortnight an elected member of the Assembly, Gerry McHugh, has resigned from Sinn Fein solely over their stance on the policing issue,” he stated.

Two of Mr. O’Connor’s companions: his brother, Philip, and Colm Donnelly; and two people who had been drinking in a nearby bar: Mr. O’Connor’s former co-accused, Paul Corrigan, and his partner, Emer McGullion, gave evidence about the incident.

Mr. McCubbin, the deputy investigating officer with the Police Ombudsman’s Office in Belfast, accepted under cross-examination that the same standards applied to their investigations as are applied to a police investigation and that witnesses would be interviewed whether their evidence pointed towards or away from a suspect.

The R.M. said that in this case “that level of fairness does not seem to have been observed.”

He stated: “This matter does need to be investigated and it is in the public interest that it does be investigated. I’m really concerned about it.

“I’m interested in how the Ombudsman’s office investigated this and if they investigated it fairly and properly,” he added.

Mr. McCubbin was shown a statement from an independent witness, Mr. David Black, identifying people in the vicinity of where Mr. O’Connor’s group was and accusing them of making sectarian remarks. It was suggested to him that the failure of the Ombudsman’s office to interview Mr. Black was “an astonishing failure to follow up a line of inquiry.”

The R.M. said it was “absolutely unacceptable” from the point of view of a fair investigation and people like Mr. Black ought to have been interviewed. Mr. Dunlop went on to point out to Mr. McCubbin that the other police officers on duty with Constable McCabe were not interviewed nor were other independent witnesses from the Royal Black Preceptory nor Edel McCusker.

Mr. McCubbin agreed that these were reasonable people to have been interviewed and accepted that it was not fair that not one witness who could have backed up Constable McCabe was interviewed.

The court was told that Constable McCabe was surrounded by a hostile crowd while arresting Mr. O’Connor.

The R.M. commented: “He must have been a very brave officer to attempt to arrest somebody, single handed, in that situation and that is to his credit.”

Mr. Dunlop submitted that the case had the “most appalling” inconsistencies that one could imagine and that the witnesses had told a range of lies.

The R.M. agreed that “certainly there are inconsistencies” in the evidence.

Dismissing the case against Constable McCabe he stated: “Had it been investigated fairly and properly this case would never have got off the ground.”

And he concluded: “I must say that if I had the power to do it I would award costs against the Ombudsman.”