The men who rule the IRA
Henry McDonald
Guardian
September 03 2008
Background to the provisional army council
The IRA’s army council is a republican paramilitary version of the old Soviet Union politburo.
Just as in the Soviet Union, where a small clique of men decided on life and death matters over millions, since the mid-1980s (with a few exceptions) seven men have determined the direction of the IRA.
Theocratic interpretations of Irish republicanism deem that this body, known by its full name of provisional army council, or PAC, constitutes the real government of Ireland. Because hardliners regarded the Irish Free State formed by Michael Collins in 1921 and Eamon de Valera’s later governments as apostates who abandoned republican purity and embraced constitutional politics, those who remained loyal to the original Irish republic envisaged by the rebels of 1916 were deemed the true, authentic government of Ireland.
Of course, such dogma was far removed from the realities of Ireland, north and south, after the Irish civil war. In what became the Irish Republic, the southern population became accustomed to and ultimately loyal to the state, even if republicans regarded it as wholly illegitimate because it left out the six counties of what had become Northern Ireland.
Yet the notion of the purist “government in internal exile” gave the army council down the years an almost mystical quality that demanded loyalty within the hardline republican community. It meant that from the genesis of the Troubles in 1969, when the Provisionals emerged from a split within the IRA, the movement would be ruled on a top-down basis, with no one within the ranks questioning the decisions of its leadership.
Paradoxically, while this small, unelected band of men waged a campaign of terror that never had the support of the majority of nationalist Ireland, its tight military structure and close-knit nature helped the modern republican movement reverse out of the cul de sac of armed struggle.
Decisions to inch the IRA, and by association Sinn Fein, away from violence were taken by a relatively small elite group headed by Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness. There is now plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest much of this process was kept secret from the IRA’s rank and file, at least until it was too late to go into reverse and plunge Ireland back into the Troubles.
Privately, the British and Irish governments and their security organs admit that it was better that this creeping process towards normal politics was directed by such a tightly bound, secretive and small body of men.
In addition, they point to the danger of the unionists getting hung up on insisting this same body be dissolved — not just because the army council delivered an end to the campaign but also because of the impracticality of monitoring whether seven men in a room, ex-army council members, constitute any kind of threat in the future.
The trouble with Northern Ireland politics is that the symbol is almost as important as the substance, if not more so. Unionists such as Peter Robinson need the symbol of the army council’s dissolution to convince supporters they are not selling out. Conversely, the men who run an IRA that is no longer active do not want their members to perceive disbandment of the body once believed to be the true government of Ireland as being a humiliating defeat.
With the major political parties onside, and the Provisional IRA and the main Protestant paramilitary groups abandoning violence, there was an almost tangible sense of optimism among the many friends whom I made as a journalist covering the worst of ‘the Troubles’. But now concern is growing about the threat posed by armed Republican factions who remain bitterly opposed to the power-sharing arrangements that underpin the entire peace agreement.
Subsequent forensic tests on the weapon’s warhead detected the presence of Semtex, the powerful plastic explosive that was used extensively by Provisional IRA bomb makers. In June, a massive home-made landmine concealed in a milk churn would almost certainly have killed two PSNI officers who had been lured into the vicinity had its trigger mechanism not malfunctioned.
Although the devolved administration may be in jeopardy, there is no apparent danger that the peace process - or the ceasefires - will collapse.

'So venceremos, beidh bua againn eigin lá eigin. Sealadaigh abú.'
--Bobby Sands